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“There’s Voices in the Night Trying to
Be Heard”
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE CONVENTION ON
THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ON
DOMESTIC MENTAL DISABILITY LAW
Michael L. Perlin† & Naomi M. Weinstein††
INTRODUCTION
We cannot consider the impact of anti-discrimination law
on persons with mental disabilities without a full understanding
of how sanism1 permeates all aspects of the legal system—in
judicial opinions, legislation, the role of lawyers, juror decisionmaking—and the entire fabric of American society.2
Notwithstanding nearly thirty years of experience under the
Americans with Disabilities Act,3 and an impressive corpus of
constitutional case law and state statutes,4 the attitudes of
judges, jurors, and lawyers often reflect the same level of bigotry

† Adjunct Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law; Instructor,
Loyola University New Orleans, Department of Criminology and Justice; Professor
Emeritus of Law and Founding Director, International Mental Disability Law Reform
Project, New York Law School. Co-founder, Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates.
J.D., Columbia University, 1969; A.B., Rutgers University, 1966. The authors wish to
thank Rachel Hisler for her excellent research assistance.
†† Associate Attorney, Mental Hygiene Legal Service. J.D., New York Law
School, 2010; B.A., Tufts University, 2006. The views expressed in this article are of the
authors and may not be representative of those of the Mental Hygiene Legal Service.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 41–54 for definition and explanation.
2 In this article, we also will make reference to Canadian developments, which
parallel U.S. developments in many important ways, but diverge in others.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (1990).
4 See Michael L. Perlin, “They Keep It All Hid”: The Ghettoization of Mental
Disability Law and Its Implications for Legal Education, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 857, 857
n.2 (2010) [hereinafter Perlin, “They Keep It All Hid”] (listing cases). For the Canadian
and Australian perspectives, see Ravi Malhotra, The Implications of the Social Model of
Disablement for the Legal Regulation of the Modern Workplace in Canada and the
United States, 33 MANITOBA L.J. 1, 25 (2009) [hereinafter Malhotra (listing cases). See
generally Ron McCallum & Hannah Martin, A Forgotten Cohort: Citizenship through
Work and Persons with Disabilities, 41 QUEEN’S L.J. 317 (2016).
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that defined this area of law a half century ago.5 The reasons for
this are complex and, to a great extent, flow from centuries of
prejudice—often hidden and socially acceptable prejudice6—that
has persisted in spite of prophylactic legislative and judicial
reforms, and a seemingly (on the surface) significant uptick in
public awareness.7 One of the co-authors has railed multiple
times about the “irrational,” “corrosive,” “malignant,”
“pervasive,” “vicious,” and “ravaging” effects of sanism, but its
“pernicious power” still poisons all of mental disability law.8 And
scholars in other disciplines are now exploring the impact of that
poison on daily social interactions as well.9
5 See generally Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”:
Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Lepers
and Crooks] (discussing how sanism affects all participants in the judicial system).
6 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL
DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000) (explaining why this prejudice is often hidden from view).
7 On how an awareness of the power of sanism is necessary in any
consideration of any aspect of the mental disability law system, see Perlin, “They Keep It
All Hid”, supra note 4, at 860–61.
8 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say
What It Is I’ve Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment
Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 750 (2005) [hereinafter Perlin, Best Friend] (“irrational”);
Michael L. Perlin, “Life Is In Mirrors, Death Disappears”: Giving Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. L.
REV. 315, 346 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Life Is In Mirrors] (“ravaging”); Michael L. Perlin,
“She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, the Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance
of “Ordinary Common Sense,” 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 25 (2003) [hereinafter
Perlin, She Breaks] (“malignant and corrosive”); Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo,
“Tolling for the Aching Ones Whose Wounds Cannot Be Nursed”: The Marginalization of
Racial Minorities and Women in Institutional Mental Disability Law Policing Rape
Complaints, J. GENDER, RACE & JUST., Summer 2017, at 431, 451 [hereinafter Perlin &
Cucolo, Tolling for the Aching Ones] (“malignant and corrosive”); Michael L. Perlin,
“Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain”: Considering the Sexual Autonomy
Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and
in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 502 (2008) [hereinafter Perlin, Making Love] (“corrosive”);
Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed”: Looking at Non-institutional Mental Disability
Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 541 (2002) [hereinafter Perlin,
Things Have Changed] (“pernicious power”); Michael L. Perlin, “God Said to Abraham/Kill
Me a Son”: Why the Insanity Defense and the Incompetency Status are Compatible with and
Required by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Basic Principles
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477, 510 (2017) [hereinafter Perlin,
God Said] (“vicious”); Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Mr. Bad Example”: Why
Lawyers Need to Embrace Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Root out Sanism in the
Representation of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 16 WYO. L. REV. 299, 306 (2016)
[hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Mr. Bad Example] (“pervasive stigma”). On the “corrosive”
impact of sanism on criminal sentencing of defendants with post-traumatic stress disorder,
see Michael L. Perlin, “I Expected It to Happen/I Knew He’d Lost Control”: The Impact of
PTSD on Criminal Sentencing after the Promulgation of DSM-5, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 881,
887–88 (2015). On its “corrosive” impact on the entire criminal trial process, see Michael L.
Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, “You Might Have Drugs at Your Command”: Reconsidering
the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-trial Detainees from the Perspectives of
International Human Rights and Income Inequality, 8 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 381, 395
(2015) [hereinafter Perlin & Schriver, Drugs at Your Command].
9 See, e.g., Greg Procknow, Silence or Sanism: A Review of the Dearth of
Discussions on Mental Illness in Adult Education, 29 NEW HORIZONS ADULT EDUC. & HUM.
RESOURCE DEV. 6–7 (2017); Stephanie LeBlanc & Elizabeth Anne Kinsella, Toward
Epistemic Justice: A Critically Reflexive Examination of ‘Sanism’ and Implications for
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Certainly, the passage of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) in 199010—far and away the broadest antidiscrimination law ever enacted on behalf of this population—gave
great hope at that time. Commentators then raved about its
“breathtaking promise”11 and characterized it as “the most
important civil rights act passed since 1964,”12 and the
“Emancipation Proclamation for those with disabilities.”13 It was,
or so many of us thought, “without question, Congress’ most
innovative attempt to address the pervasive problems of
discrimination against citizens with physical and mental
disabilities by providing, in the words of a congressional committee,
‘a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
[of] discrimination against individuals with disabilities.’”14
We remain generally optimistic, though our optimism has
been somewhat tempered both by subsequent court decisions15
Knowledge Generation, 10 STUD. SOC JUST. 59 (2016); Tonette S. Rocco, Sanism, Black Dogs
Barking, and Mental Illness, 29 NEW HORIZONS ADULT EDUC. & HUM. RESOURCE DEV. 1, 1–2
(2017); MAD MATTERS: A CRITICAL READER IN CANADIAN MAD STUDIES (Brenda A. LeFrançois,
Robert Menzies & Geoffrey Reaume eds., 2013); Jennifer Poole et al., Sanism, ‘Mental Health,’
and Social Work/Education: A Review and Call to Action, 1 INTERSECTIONALITIES 20, 21
(2012); Marina Morrow & Julia Weisser, Towards a Social Justice Framework of Mental
Health Recovery, 6 STUD. SOC JUST. 27, 28 (2012); Essya M. Nabbali, A “Mad” Critique of the
Social Model of Disability, 9 INT’L J. DIVERSITY IN ORGAN., COMMUNITIES & NATIONS 1 (2009);
Brenda A. LeFrancois & Vicki Coppock, Psychiatrist Children and Their Rights: Starting the
Conversation, 28 CHILD. & SOC’Y 165, 166 (2014); PhebeAnn M. Wolframe, The Madwoman
in the Academy, or, Revealing the Invisible Straightjacket: Theorizing and Teaching Saneism
and Sane Privilege, 33 DISAB. STUD. Q. NO. 1 (2012); for recent considerations of sanism in a
variety of social policy contexts, see generally CRITICAL INQUIRIES FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE IN
MENTAL HEALTH (Marina Morrow & Lorraine Halinka Malcoe eds., 2017).
10 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
11 Bonnie Milstein et al., The Americans With Disabilities Act: A Breathtaking
Promise for Persons with Mental Disabilities, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1240, 1240 (1991).
12 Kimberly A. Ackourey, Insuring Americans With Disabilities: How Far Can
Congress Go To Protect Traditional Practices?, 40 EMORY L.J. 1183, 1183 n.1 (1991)
(quoting Kent Jenkins, Jr., Spotlight Finds Hoyer, WASH. POST (May 28, 1990)).
13 Id. (quoting AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: SUMMARY AND
ANALYSIS, SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT (BNA), at S-5).
14 Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on the
Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193,
218–19 (2000), (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 1, at 3 (1990)). The United States is not
the only nation to have passed such anti-discrimination legislation. By way of example, the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was amended in 1981 so as to include, as a
protected category, persons with physical and mental disability. Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, sec. 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act, 1982, c 11 (UK), 1982. For an evaluation of the similarities and differences in the two
nations’ laws, see Arlene S. Kanter, A Comparative View of Equality under the UN Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Disability Laws of the United States and
Canada, 32 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST., no. 2, 2015, at 65, 88–89 (2015).
15 The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) was enacted expressly to
legislatively overrule the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471 (1999), and Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002),
by expanding the statutory definition of “disability” within the ADA, and by seeking to
reinvigorate “regarded as” prong in the ADA’s definition of disability. See ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at
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and by efforts in Congress to cut back on the scope of the ADA.16
By example, the titles of some of the articles about the ADA by
one of the co-authors and others reflect that diminution of
optimism.17 Notwithstanding this, we believe that the ADA still
can and must be relied upon as a source of rights for persons with
mental disabilities in multiple discrete areas of law and policy.18
At the time at which mental disability law scholars were
beginning to focus on the ADA, few considered the dim-on-thehorizon potential redemptive influence of international human
rights law. Eric Rosenthal and Leonard Rubenstein had written

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12103 and 12205a, amending 29 U.S.C. § 705, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101,
12102, 12111 to 12114, 12201, and 12210, re-designating 42 U.S.C. §§ 12206 to 12213,
and enacting provisions set out as notes under 29 U.S.C. § 705 and 42 U.S.C. § 12101.);
see also MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL, at § 11-4, at 11-124 to 11-125 (3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter PERLIN &
CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW]. The ADA Amendments are discussed carefully in
Paul A. Race & Seth M. Dornier, ADA Amendments Act of 2008: The Effect on Employers
and Educators, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 357 (2009); Stephen Befort, Let’s Try this Again:
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Attempts to Reinvigorate the ‘Regarded As’ Prong of
the Statutory Definition of Disability, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 993 (2010).
16 See, e.g., Carlos Ballesteros, House Votes to Gut the Americans With Disabilities
Act to Nip ‘Abusive Lawsuits,’ NEWSWEEK (Feb. 15, 2018), http://www.newsweek.com/houserepublicans-americans-disabilities-act-civil-rights-808106 [https://perma.cc/DS4D-SNCR].
17 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities:
Can Sanist Attitudes Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15 (1993); Michael L. Perlin, “Make
Promises by the Hour”: Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL
L. REV. 947 (1997) [hereinafter Perlin, Make Promises]; Michael L. Perlin, “I Ain’t Gonna
Work on Maggie’s Farm No More”: Institutional Segregation, Community Treatment, the
ADA, and the Promise of Olmstead v. L.C., 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 53 (2000); Michael L.
Perlin, “What’s Good Is Bad, What’s Bad Is Good, You’ll Find out When You Reach the Top,
You’re on the Bottom”: Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.)
Anything More than “Idiot Wind”?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235 (2002); Ali Abrar & Kerry
J. Dingle, From Madness to Method: The Americans with Disabilities Act Meets the Internet,
44 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 133, 133 (2009); Debbie N. Kaminer, Mentally Ill Employees in
the Workplace: Does the ADA Amendments Act Provide Adequate Protection?, 26 HEALTH
MATRIX 205, 205 (2016); Thomas J. Auner, For the Protection of Society’s Most Vulnerable,
the ADA Should Apply to Arrests, 49 LOY. L.A. REV. 335, 335 (2016).
18 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “All His Sexless Patients”:
Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257,
297–99 (2014) [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Sexless Patients] (sexual autonomy); Michael
L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, “Friend to the Martyr, a Friend to the Woman of Shame”:
Thinking About the Law, Shame and Humiliation, 24 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 30–
33 (2014) [hereinafter Perlin & Weinstein, Friend to the Martyr) (deinstitutionalization and
community treatment); Naomi M. Weinstein & Michael L. Perlin, “Who’s Pretending to
Care for Him?” How the Endless Jail-to-Hospital-to-Street-Repeat Cycle Deprives Persons
with Mental Disabilities the Right to Continuity of Care, 8 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 455,
457–58 (2018) (right to continuity of care); Perlin & Schriver, Drugs at Your Command,
supra note 8, at 403; (availability of potential pre-trial alternatives in the case of currentlyincompetent criminal defendants). Similarly, Canadian scholars have critiqued the
Supreme Court of Canada as remaining “remedially timid” in its interpretations of the
Charter’s disability anti-discrimination provision. See Malhotra, supra note 4, at 27
(quoting Dianne Pothier, Legal Developments in the Supreme Court of Canada Regarding
Disability, in CRITICAL DISABILITY THEORY: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, POLICY AND
LAW 316 (Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin eds., 2006)).
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their groundbreaking piece,19 International Human Rights Advocacy
Under the “Principles For The Protection Of Persons With Mental
Illness,”20 in 1993, but it had been barely mentioned in the law
journals—only cited seven times prior to 2002.21 When Rosenthal
and Rubenstein first illuminated how the United Nations’ Mental
Illness (MI) Principles22—in many ways the forerunner of the United
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD)—came “from an individualistic, libertarian perspective that
emphasizes restrictions on what the state can do to a person with
mental illness,”23 they inspired lawyers, advocates, professors, and
progressive mental health professionals to begin thinking seriously
about the intersection between international human rights law and
mental disability law.24
19 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD 3–19 (2012) [hereinafter PERLIN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS].
20 Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein, International Human Rights
Advocacy under the “Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness,” 16 INT’L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 257 (1993) [hereinafter Rosenthal & Rubenstein].
21 Per WESTLAW search, Feb. 12, 2019. See Pamela Schwartz Cohen,
Psychiatric Commitment in Japan: International Concern and Domestic Reform, 14
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 28, 35 (1995); Norbert Gilmore, Drug Use and Human Rights:
Privacy, Vulnerability, Disability, and Human Rights Infringements, 12 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 355 (1996); Arlene Kanter & Kristin Dadey, The Right to Asylum for
People with Disabilities, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1117 (2000); Robin Munro, Judicial Psychiatry
in China and Its Political Abuses, 14 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2000); Angelika C. Moncada,
Involuntary Commitment and the Use of Seclusion and Restraint in Uruguay: A
Comparison with the United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental
Illness, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 589 (1994); Allyn R. Taylor, An International
Regulatory Strategy for Global Tobacco Control, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 257 (1996); Allyn R.
Taylor, Globalization and Biotechnology: UNESCO and an International Strategy to
Advance Human Rights and Public Health, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 479 (1999).
22 The Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the
Improvement of Mental Health Care are widely referred to as the “MI Principles.” See,
e.g., Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 259; see also G.A. Res. 46/119, annex,
Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of
Mental Health Care (Dec. 17, 1991).
23 Rosenthal & Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 260. The MI Principles subsequently
became “the centrepiece of the human rights based approach to mental health care” in
Australia. See Neil Rees, International Human Rights Obligations and Mental Health Review
Tribunals, 10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 33, 34–38 (2003); see also Terry Carney, Mental
Health in Postmodern Society: Time for New Paradigms?, 10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 12,
14 (2003). Response to the Principles was not entirely positive. See, e.g., Tina Minkowitz, The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Right to be Free
from Nonconsensual Psychiatric Interventions, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 405, 407
(2007) (criticizing MI Principles for not being sufficiently protective of the rights of persons
with psychosocial disabilities, especially in the context of the right to refuse treatment); T.W.
Harding, Human Rights Law in the Field of Mental Health: A Critical Review, 101 ACTA
PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 24, 24 (2000) (discussing how MI Principles are “basically
flawed,” also in the context of the right to refuse treatment). For a discussion of criticisms, see
H. Archibald Kaiser, Canadian Mental Health Law: The Slow Process of Redirecting the Ship
of State, 17 HEALTH L.J. 139, 160 (2009).
24 This led to a symposium at New York Law School in 2002 on International
Human Rights Law and the Institutional Treatment of Persons with Mental Disabilities:
The Case of Hungary, the first such program ever put on at any US-based law school. See
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Disability rights took center stage at the United Nations
in the most significant historical development in the recognition
of the human rights of persons with mental disabilities: the
drafting and adoption of a binding international disability rights
convention.25 In late 2001, the United Nations General Assembly
established an Ad Hoc Committee “to consider proposals for a
comprehensive and integral international convention to promote
and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities.”26
The Ad Hoc Committee drafted a document over the course of
five years and eight sessions, and the new Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)27 was adopted in
December 2006 and opened for signature in March 2007.28 It
entered into force, thus becoming legally binding on State
parties, on May 3, 2008, thirty days after the twentieth
ratification.29 One of the hallmarks of the process that led to the
Symposium, International Human Rights Law and the Institutional Treatment of Persons
with Mental Disabilities: The Case of Hungary, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 340
(2002). Presenters at this conference included Rosenthal, Krassimir Kanev, “a human
rights advocate with the Bulgaria Helsinki Committee”, Gabor Gombos, head of the most
important psychiatric survivor organization in Hungary, and Eva Szeli, then “Director of
European Operations at MDRI’s Budapest office.” See id. at 346–48. Professor Szeli
subsequently co-authored with the co-author of this article and three others the first
casebook on the intersection between mental disability law and international human rights
as well as other articles about the CRPD. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS AND COMPARATIVE MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(2006); see also Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights:
Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: VISION,
PRAXIS, AND COURAGE 88 (Michael Dudley et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter Perlin & Szeli,
Evolution and Contemporary Challenges]; Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health
Law and Human Rights: Evolution, Challenges and the Promise of the New Convention, in
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 241 (Jukka Kumpuvuori & Martin Scheinin eds., 2010)
[hereinafter Perlin & Szeli, Promise of the New Convention]. Major articles based on
presentations at that conference include Eric Rosenthal & Clarence J. Sundram,
International Human Rights in Mental Health Legislation, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 469 (2002), and Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Treatment of People
with Mental Illness in Eastern Europe: Construing International Human Rights Law, 21
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 537 (2002).
25 On the singular role of this Convention, see Frederic Megret, The Disabilities
Convention: Toward a Holistic Concept of Rights, 12 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 261 (2008); Frederic
Megret, The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or
Disability Rights?, 30 HUM. RIGHTS Q. 494 (2008) [hereinafter Megret, Disability Rights];
Perlin & Szeli, Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, supra note 24, at 81; Perlin &
Szeli, Promise of the New Convention, supra note 24, at 243; Michael L. Perlin, “A Change
Is Gonna Come”: The Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability Law,
29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483 (2009) [hereinafter Perlin, A Change is Gonna Come].
26 G.A. Res. 56/168, ¶ 1 (Dec. 19, 2001).
27 G.A. Res. 61/106, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Dec.
13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD].
28 Id.
29 On the twentieth ratification, see Press Release, With 20 Ratifications,
Landmark Disability Treaty Set to Enter Into Force on 3 May, U.N. Press Release HR/4941
(Apr. 3, 2008), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/hr4941.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/
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publication of the CRPD was the participation of persons with
disabilities and the clarion cry, “Nothing about us, without us.”30
This has led commentators to conclude that “the CRPD is
regarded as having finally empowered the ‘world’s largest minority’
to claim their rights, and to participate in international and
national affairs on an equal basis with others who have achieved
specific treaty recognition and protection.”31 As we discuss,32 this
Convention is the most revolutionary international human rights
document ever ratified that applies to persons with disabilities.33
Our hope is that the CRPD serves as a vehicle that will finally
extinguish the toxic stench of sanism that permeates all levels of
society.34 There is certainly precedent for international human
rights treaties and conventions to be used in domestic courts.35
C2RV-BKP5]; see Tara J. Melish, The UN Disability Convention: Historic Process, Strong
Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Jan. 2007, at 37, 44; Michael
Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203,
1126 (2007). As of the time of the preparation of this paper, 177 nations have ratified the
Convention. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD) https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-therights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html [https://perma.cc/QH4S-9PBC].
30 Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 n.15
(2008) (“Statement by Hon Ruth Dyson, Minister for Disability Issues, New Zealand
Mission to the UN, for Formal Ceremony at the Signing of the Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disability, 30 March 2007: ‘Just as the Convention itself is the product
of a remarkable partnership between governments and civil society, effective
implementation will require a continuation of that partnership.’ The negotiating slogan
‘Nothing about us without us’ was adopted by the International Disability Caucus.”).
31 Id. at 4. See generally Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Liberty and Security of
the Person, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: A
COMMENTARY 402 (Ilias Bantekas et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON UN
CONVENTION] (discussing Article 14).
32 See infra text accompanying notes 83–146.
33 Perlin & Szeli, Evolution and Contemporary Challenges, supra note 24, at
81; PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 19 , at 24.
34 “[T]he dynamics of sanism and pretextuality are a toxic combination that
potentially weakens any enforcement opportunities of the CRPD.” Elayne E. Greenberg,
Overcoming Our Global Disability in the Workforce: Mediating the Dream, 86 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 579, 593 (2012).
“Pretextuality” means that courts regularly accept (either implicitly or explicitly)
testimonial dishonesty, countenance liberty deprivations in disingenuous ways
that bear little or no relationship to case law or to statutes and engage similarly
in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically where
witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a “high propensity to purposely
distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends.”
PERLIN & CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 15, § 2-3, at 2-10 to 2-11(citing
in part Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of “Ordinary
Common Sense,” Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991)).
35 See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980), aff ’ d
in part & rev’d in part, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing to the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners in cases involving the “double bunking” of
inmates). But see Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 257–59 (2d Cir. 2003)
(holding United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) did not convey a
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This article considers whether the CRPD, ratified or not, is
likely to eradicate—or, at least, seriously reduce—domestic sanism.
This article proceeds in the following parts. Part I discusses our
sanist past, while Part II discusses our sanist present. Part III
considers how the CRPD has the greatest potential for combating
sanism and changing social attitudes. In doing so, this Part looks at
five universal core factors that must be considered when evaluating
the impact of the CRPD.36 Part IV draws on the tools of therapeutic
jurisprudence when evaluating the impact of the CRPD.37 Finally,
this article offers some brief and modest conclusions.
The title of this paper comes from a song from Bob
Dylan’s 1997 album, Time Out of Mind. The song—Million
Miles38—has been termed by Dylan chronicler Oliver Trager as
a “jaded, late-century, person-to-person confession of
alienation,”39 and that is probably about right. The line that
starts this paper, “There’s voices in the night trying to be heard,”
reflects Dylan’s song-persona’s sense of loneliness as he sings
“I’m tryin’ to get closer but I’m still a million miles from you.”
We use it here, though, as a metaphor for the CRPD’s role in any
inquiry into this aspect of disability law. Persons with
disabilities—always marginalized, always ignored, always
trivialized, all through sanism—have the “voices in the night
trying to be heard.”40 Perhaps the CRPD will redemptively allow
all of us to hear those voices.

private right of action to plaintiffs as a matter of law). In at least one case, however, while
noting that the non-ratified Convention was not binding on U.S. courts, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court “read the entire text of the convention, . . . [and in an adoption
case] conclude[d] that the outcome of the proceedings in [that] case [were] completely in
accord with principles expressed therein.” In re Adoption of Peggy, 767 N.E.2d 29, 37–38
(Mass. 2002). See generally Perlin & Schriver, Drugs at Your Command, supra note 8, at
387–88; Michael L. Perlin & Henry A. Dlugacz, “It’s Doom Alone That Counts’’: Can
International Human Rights Law Be an Effective Source of Rights in Correctional
Conditions Litigation?, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 675, 688–90 (2009).
36 See Perlin, A Change is Gonna Come, supra note 25, at 488.
37 “Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model by which we can assess
the ultimate impact of case law and legislation on mentally disabled individuals.” It
requires (1) studying the role of the law as a therapeutic agent; (2) recognizing that
substantive rules, legal procedures, and lawyers’ roles may have either therapeutic or
anti-therapeutic consequences; and (3) questioning whether such rules, procedures, and
roles can or should be reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential, while not
subordinating due-process principles. Perlin, She Breaks, supra note 8, at 30 n.233; see
also infra text accompanying notes 188–223.
39 Million Miles, Bob Dylan (1997), http://www.bobdylan.com/songs/million-miles
[http://perma.cc/Z7RS-DS9K].
39 OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 429 (2004).
40 See, e.g., PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 19; see also
RICHARD THOMAS, WHY BOB DYLAN MATTERS 188 (2017) (characterizing Million Miles
as a song that “confront[s] love that is lost, but can’t be forgotten.”).
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OUR SANIST PAST41

Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and
character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are
reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism,
homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.42
It permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all
participants in the mental disability law system: litigants, fact
finders, counsel, expert and lay witnesses.43 Its corrosive effects have
warped mental disability law jurisprudence in involuntary civil
commitment law, institutional law, tort law, and all aspects of the
criminal process (pretrial, trial and sentencing).44

It has affected us for generations, well before it was ever
identified or named.
Judges are not immune from sanism. “[E]mbedded in the
cultural presuppositions that engulf us all,”45 judges take deeper
refuge in heuristic thinking and flawed, non-reflective “ordinary
common sense,” both of which continue the myths and stereotypes
of sanism.46 They “reflect and project the conventional morality of
the community,” and “judicial decisions in all areas of [civil and
criminal] mental disability law continue to reflect and perpetuate
sanist stereotypes.”47 Their language demonstrates bias against

41 This section was largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked
Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability
Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 14–19 (1999).
42 See Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 374–75 (1992)
[hereinafter Perlin, Sanism]. The classic study of these prejudices is GORDON W.
ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 7, 14–15 (1954).
43 Michael L. Perlin, “His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will
Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV.
885, 910 (2009). There is a robust literature about sanism in other nations as well. See, e.g.,
Lora Patton, “These Regulations Aren’t Just Here to Annoy You:” The Myth of Statutory
Safeguards, Patient Rights and Charter Values in Ontario’s Mental Health System, 25
WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 9, 22 (2008); H. Archibald Kaiser, Conway: A Bittersweet
Victory for Not Criminally Responsible Accused, 75 C.R. 1–2(2010); Aaron A. Dhir,
Relationships of Force: Reflections on Law, Psychiatry and Human Rights, 25 WINDSOR REV.
LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 103, 108–09 (2008) [hereinafter Dhir, Relationships of Force].
44 Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, supra note 5, at 684.
45 Anthony D’Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32
WM. & MARY L. REV. 329, 332 (1991).
46 Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: “Ordinary
Common Sense” and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 67 (1990); Michael L. Perlin,
Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier? 20
NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 539 (1993–1994) (on how sanist myths pervade judicial
decision making). The Supreme Court has been guilty of this behavior for over ninety
years. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (“[T]hree generations of imbeciles are
enough”). For a refutation of Buck, see generally PAUL LOMBARDO, THREE GENERATIONS,
NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. BELL (2008).
47 See Perlin, Sanism, supra note 42, at 400–04.
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individuals with mental disabilities48 and contempt for the mental
health professions.49 “Courts often appear impatient with mentally
disabled litigants, ascribing their problems in the legal process to
weak character or poor resolve.”50 Thus, a popular sanist myth is
that “[m]entally disabled individuals simply don’t try hard enough.
They give in too easily to their basest instincts, and do not exercise
appropriate self-restraint.”51 We assume that “[m]entally ill
individuals are presumptively incompetent to participate in
‘normal’ activities [and] to make autonomous decisions about their
lives (especially in areas involving medical care).”52
At its base, sanism is irrational.53 Any investigation of the
roots or sources of mental disability jurisprudence must factor in
society’s irrational mechanisms that govern our dealings with
individuals with mental disabilities.54 The entire legal system
48 Although, in recent years, what was commonplace for decades—see Corn v.
Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 569 (11th Cir. 1983) (defendant referred to as a “lunatic”); Sinclair
v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Shuler v. Wainwright, 491
F.2d 1213, 1223 (5th Cir. 1974)) (using “lunatic”); Brown v. People, 134 N.E.2d 760, 762
(Ill. 1956) (trial judge asked defendant, “You are not crazy at this time, are you?”); Pyle
v. Boles, 250 F. Supp. 285, 288 n.3 (N.D. W. Va. 1966) (trial judge accused habeas
petitioner of “being crazy”); cf. State v. Penner, 772 P.2d 819 (Kan. 1989) (unpublished
disposition), at *3 (witnesses admonished not to refer to defendant as “crazy” or “nuts”)—
has largely abated, there are still some recent examples to consider, see, e.g., Carnegie
v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (using “lunatic”); United States
v. Garza, 751 F.3d 1130, 1136 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Even a mentally deranged defendant is
out of luck if there is no indication that he failed to understand or assist in his criminal
proceedings.”); see also Michelle Armstrong, Note, Addressing Defendants Who Are
“Crazy, But Not Crazy Enough”: How Hall v. Florida Changes the Death Penalty for
Mentally Ill Defendants, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 743, 744–45 (2016).
49 See Commonwealth v. Musolino, 467 A.2d 605, 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)
(reversible error for trial judge to refer to expert witnesses as “headshrinkers”). Compare
State v. Percy, 507 A.2d 955, 956–57 n.1 (Vt. 1986) (reversing a conviction where
prosecutor, in closing argument, referred to expert testimony as “psycho-babble”), with
Commonwealth v. Cosme, 575 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Mass. 1991) (not error where prosecutor
referred to defendant’s expert witnesses as “a little head specialist” and a “wizard”). See
generally Douglas Mossman & Marshall B. Kapp, “Courtroom Whores”?—or Why Do
Attorneys Call Us?: Findings from a Survey on Attorneys’ Use of Mental Health Experts,
26 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 27, 27–28 (1998).
50 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of
Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 670–71 (1993) [hereinafter Perlin, Pretexts].
51 Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 42, at 396; see, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric
of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REV. 197, 238 (1990) (in the insanity defense trial of John W.
Hinckley, charged with the attempted murder of then-President Ronald Reagan, the
prosecutor suggested to jurors, “if Hinckley had emotional problems, they were largely
his own fault”); see also State v. Duckworth, 496 So. 2d 624, 635 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (no
error when juror who felt defendant would be responsible for actions as long as he
“wanted to do them” not excused for cause).
52 Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 42, at 394.
53 See, e.g., Perlin, Lepers and Crooks, supra note 5, at 684.
54 See generally Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism
Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. L. REV. 599 (1989) (discussing
the idiosyncratic development of the insanity defense and the interplay of psychiatry,
the law, and public notions of good versus evil that underlie empirical and social myths
about persons with mental illness).
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makes assumptions about persons with mental disabilities—who
they are, how they got that way, what makes them different, what
there is about them that lets us treat them differently, and whether
their conditions are immutable.55 These assumptions reflect our
fears and apprehensions about mental disability, persons with
mental disability, and the possibility that we may become mentally
disabled.56 We rarely ask the most important question of all:57 why
do we feel the way we do about these people?
Consider now the deleterious impact of sanism on mental
disability law, especially institutional mental disability law. We
must consider carefully five universal core factors that
contaminate the practice and reality of mental disability law when
evaluating the impact of sanism on international human rights,
one of the main focuses of this paper.58 These core factors are:

55 See generally MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990) (exploring the historical sources of the ideas about
difference resulting in contradictory legal strategies for persons with disabilities and
arguing for jurisprudence based on the ability to recognize and work with perceptible forms
of difference); SANDER GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY,
RACE, AND MADNESS 19–35 (1985) (on the history of psychoanalysis and the stereotypes of
persons with mental illness and sexuality using historical and literary examples).
56 See Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the “Insanity Defense”—Why Not?,
72 Yale L.J. 853, 868–69 (1963); Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and
Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 63, 93 n.174, 108 (1991) (on
society’s fears of mentally disabled persons); id. at 93 n.174 (“[W]hile race and sex are
immutable, we all can become mentally ill, homeless, or both. Perhaps this illuminates the
level of virulence we experience here.”). On the way that public fears about the purported
link between mental illness and dangerousness “drive the formal laws and policies”
governing mental disability jurisprudence, see John Monahan, Mental Disorder and
Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 511 (1992).
57 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 6–
7 (1994) (asking this question); cf. Carmel Rogers, Proceedings Under the Mental Health
Act 1992: The Legalisation of Psychiatry, 1994 N.Z. L.J. 404, 408 (1994) (“Because the
preserve of psychiatry is populated by ‘the mad’ and ‘the loonies,’ we do not really want
to look at it too closely—it is too frightening and maybe contaminating.”). On how sanism
is more pernicious than stigma, see Matthew Large & Christopher J. Ryan, Sanism,
Stigma and the Belief in Dangerousness, 46 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 1099, 1099–
1100 (2012). On how sanism may have permeated the profession and practice of social
work, see Poole et al., supra note 9, at 24. On the role of the media in perpetuating such
stigma, see generally Danielle Andrewartha, Words Will Never Hurt? Media
Stigmatisation of People with Mental Illnesses in the Criminal Justice Context, 35
ALTERNATIVE L.J. 4 (2010). On how it explains the “double standard[s]” present in much
mental health legislation, see Christopher James Ryan, One Flu Over the Cuckoo’s Nest:
Comparing Legislated Coercive Treatment for Mental Illness with that for Other Illness,
8 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 87, 87–88, 91 (2011). On how writers in other disciplines
beyond law and psychology have begun to embrace the concept of sanism, see PERLIN &
CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 15, § 2-2, at 2-10 n.52.1 (citing sources).
58 Perlin, A Change is Gonna Come, supra note 25, at 487.
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1. Lack of comprehensive legislation to govern the commitment and
treatment of persons with mental disabilities, and failure to adhere to
legislative mandates.59
2. Lack of independent counsel and lack of consistent judicial review
mechanisms made available to persons facing commitment and those
institutionalized.60
3.

Failure to provide humane care to institutionalized persons.61

4. Lack of coherent and integrated community programs as an
alternative to institutionalized care.62
5.

Failure to provide humane services to forensic patients.63

Failure to consider these factors means that we are doomed to
continue a sanist system that ignores the basic principles of
international human rights law.64
Sanism, along with pretextuality,65 has controlled and
continues to control modern mental disability law. Just as
importantly (perhaps, more importantly), these forces continue
to exert this control invisibly.66 This invisibility means that the
most important aspects of mental disability law—not just the
law “on the books,” but, more importantly, the law in action and

59 Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental
Disability Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 333, 337 (2007).
60 Id. at 340.
61 Id. at 343.
62 Id. at 349.
63 Id. at 354.
64 See generally PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 19.
65 “Pretextuality describes the ways in which courts accept testimonial
dishonesty—especially by expert witnesses—and engage similarly in dishonest (and
frequently meretricious) decision-making. It is especially poisonous where courts accept
witness testimony that shows a ‘high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in
order to achieve desired ends.” Perlin & Cucolo, Tolling for the Aching Ones, supra note
8, at 452 (quoting Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, supra note 34, at 133); see also
Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror”: The Legal Profession’s Willful and
Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 602 (2008):

The pretexts of the forensic mental health system are reflected both in the
testimony of forensic experts and in the decisions of legislators and factfinders. Experts frequently testify in accordance with their own self-referential
concepts of “morality” and openly subvert statutory and case-law criteria that
impose rigorous behavioral standards as predicates for commitment or that
articulate functional standards as prerequisites for an incompetency-to-standtrial finding. Often this testimony is further warped by a heuristic bias. Expert
witnesses—like the rest of us—succumb to the seductive allure of simplifying
cognitive devices in their thinking and employ such heuristic gambits as the
vividness effect or attribution theory in their testimony.
See also PERLIN & CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 15, §§ 2-3 et seq. See
generally Perlin, supra note 19, at 15.
66 Michael L. Perlin, “Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline”: Mental
Disability Law, Theory and Practice, “Us” and “Them,” 31 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 775, 792 (1998).
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practice—remains hidden from the public discussions about
mental disability law.
II.

OUR SANIST PRESENT

Although we are more aware now of the impact of sanism
than we were forty-five years ago when it first emerged in the
legal literature, it remains unclear whether the legal system has
made the sort of structural changes needed to combat sanism’s
power.67 We will consider one example of sanism to illustrate
this: negative attitudes toward the sexual autonomy of persons
with mental disabilities, especially those who are or who have
been institutionalized.68
The right to voluntary sexual interaction for persons with
mental disabilities remains a controversial topic.69 This population
faces a double set of conflicting prejudices: on the one hand, persons
with disabilities are infantilized, and on the other hand, they are
demonized as being hypersexualized.70 Notwithstanding the fact
that the U.S. Supreme Court has implicitly recognized the right to
sexual privacy in Lawrence v. Texas,71 U.S. law has paid very little
attention to the legal rights of persons with disabilities to exercise
their autonomy, especially in institutionalized settings.72 In striking
down a Texas statute that criminalized certain intimate voluntary
conduct engaged in by two persons of the same sex, the Court
emphasized the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy
of a person making intimate and personal choices.73 However, the
Supreme Court has not directly addressed collateral sexual privacy
rights, such as the individual right to purchase and use sexual aids,
a question on which the federal courts have split.74
67 See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on Its
Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 97, 106–
07 (Frank J. Ayd, Jr. ed., 1974).
68 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN & ALISON J. LYNCH, SEXUALITY, DISABILITY
AND THE LAW: BEYOND THE LAST FRONTIER? (2016) [hereinafter PERLIN & LYNCH,
SEXUALITY, DISABILITY AND THE LAW].
69 Perlin, Making Love, supra note 8, at 483.
70 Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Love is Just a Four-Letter Word”:
Sexuality, International Human Rights, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 CAN. J. COMP.
& CONTEMP. L. 9, 10–11 (2015) [hereinafter Four-Letter Word].
71 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
72 PERLIN & LYNCH, SEXUALITY, DISABILITY AND THE LAW, supra note 68, at 23.
73 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574.
74 Compare Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1238, 1250 (11th
Cir. 2004) (declining to extrapolate from dicta in Lawrence a right to sexual privacy triggering
strict scrutiny in upholding a statutory ban on the sale of sexual devices), with Reliable
Consultants v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 747 (5th Cir. 2008) (striking down statute criminalizing
sale of sexual devices, finding that statute impermissibly burdened customer’s due process
rights to engage in private intimate conduct). The authors discuss these collateral sexual
privacy rights in Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, Said I, ‘But You Have No Choice’:
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Sanism and pretexuality rob persons with mental
disabilities of basic dignity and from exercising their right to
sexuality in institutional settings.75 Compounding the issue is
the fact that there is no standard to determine the competency
required to engage in sexual interaction.76 At the most basic
level, the test requires that an individual have the capacity to
understand there is a decision to be made and have an ability to
consent or not.77
How does this relate to the CRPD? The CRPD guarantees
a respect for dignity, the elimination of discrimination in all
matters related to interpersonal relationships, and services in
the area of sexual and reproductive health.78 “It is apparent that
the preferences and decisions of persons with disabilities must
be respected and promoted,” including decisions about sex,
sexuality and reproduction, which is a “core element of selfdetermination and empowerment.”79
Beyond the right to sexual autonomy, the CRPD
guarantees full access and participation for all persons with
disabilities.80 In addition to the right to dignity and
nondiscrimination, the CRPD also guarantees “[f]reedom from
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, . . . [f]reedom from exploitation, violence, and
abuse,”81 and a right to protection of the “integrity of the person.”82
Thus in ensuring that persons are free from humiliating and
shaming sanctions,83 sanist attitudes are directly combatted.
Nevertheless, sanism is not an issue that has gone away.
Although, as we have noted already, it is recognized more and more

Why a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client’s Decision About Mental Health Treatment Even
if It Is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 73, 108
(2017) [hereinafter Perlin & Weinstein, But You Have No Choice].
75 Perlin & Lynch, Sexless Patients, supra note 18, at 273.
76 To a significant extent, that is because of the fluidity of such a determination.
Id. at 264; see also Michael L. Perlin et al., “Some Things are Too Hot to Touch”:
Competency, the Right to Sexual Autonomy, and the Roles of Lawyers and Expert Witnesses,
35 TOURO L. REV. 405 (2019).
77 Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201,
1217 (2015).
78 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 3, 23, 25.
79 Perlin & Lynch, Sexless Patients, supra note 18, at 277.
80 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 1.
81 Id. at art. 15–16.
82 Id. at art. 17.
83 Perlin & Weinstein, Friend to the Martyr, supra note 18, at 33.
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by scholars84 and, more recently, by practitioners,85 it still remains
“under the radar” for most courts in the United States.86 In fact,
there are only a handful of court cases in the United States that even
mention the term sanism.87 This is likely due to the fact that mental
disability continues to be viewed as a hidden prejudice, one that is
ignored by society, including the judicial system, in general.88
III.

THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES

A.

In General89

We now turn to the Convention of the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CRPD). The CRPD is unique because it is the
first legally binding instrument devoted to the comprehensive
protection of the rights of persons with disabilities. It not only
clarifies that States should not discriminate against persons
84 See, e.g., Camille A. Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling Race: Policing
Race And Mental Status, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 19 n.63 (2010); John W. Parry, The
Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Lethal Dose of Stigma, Sanism, Fear
of Violence, and Faulty Predictions of Dangerousness, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY
L. REPORTER 667, 667 (2005); Deirdre M. Smith, The Disordered And Discredited Plaintiff:
Psychiatric Evidence In Civil Litigation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 749, 809 n.329 (2010); Bruce
J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe Mental
Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 847 (2009). A recent search of the Westlaw
Law Reviews and Journals database found 200 references to “sanism” in articles other than
those by the author (last searched Feb. 26, 2019). A similar search of the Westlaw
International Materials Journals database found seven references to “sanism,” other than
those by the author (last searched Feb. 25, 2019).
85 See, e.g., Bryan Lester Dupler, Capital Cases Involving Mental Retardation, 93 AM.
JUR. TRIALS § 26, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2019), (discussing sanism’s focus on the
“characteristically irrational fear of feigned mental illness”); Gregory G. Sarno, Adequacy of
Quasi-Miranda Warning Prior to Involuntary Civil Commitment, 40 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS,
Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2019) (citing Perlin, Things Have Changed, supra note 8).
86 When one of the co-authors, Michael Perlin, does domestic presentations for
forensic psychologists and/or forensic psychiatrists, the audience generally has some
sense of what sanism is. When he spoke recently, however, to the annual conferences of
both Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences and the American Society of Criminology, it
was clear that it was fairly unknown to the audience. On the other hand, just about all
in the audience were receptive and seemed to “get” the concept immediately.
Interestingly, there has been intense interest in it on the part of advocates and mental
health professionals in other nations, especially in Canada. See, e.g., Dhir, Relationships
of Force, supra note 43, at 108; Mary Donnelly, Treatment for a Mental Disorder: The
Mental Health Act 2001, Consent and the Role of Rights, 40 IRISH JURIST 220, 232, 249
n.150 (2005); Kaiser, supra note 43; Oliver Lewis, Advancing Legal Capacity
Jurisprudence, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 700, 700–01 (2011); Morrow & Weisser, supra
note 9, at 34; Nabbali, supra note 9; LeFrancois & Coppock, supra note 9, at 166; Patton,
supra note 43, at 22; Poole et al., supra note 9, at 27.
87 A Westlaw search for all federal and state cases including the term “sanism”
yielded only four results (last searched Apr. 6, 2019).
88 See Perlin, They Keep it All Hid, supra note 4, at 876.
89 This section is generally adapted from PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 19, at Chapter 7.
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with disabilities but also explicitly sets out the many steps that
States must take to create an enabling environment so that
persons with disabilities can enjoy authentic equality in
society.90 There is no question that the CRPD has “ushered in a
new era of disability rights policy.”91
The CRPD furthers the human rights approach to disability
and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in
almost every aspect of life.92 It firmly endorses a social model of
disability—a clear and direct repudiation of the medical model that
traditionally has been a part-and-parcel of mental disability law.93
“The Convention responds to traditional models, situates disability
within a social model framework94 and sketches the full range of
human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular
application to the lives of persons with disabilities.”95 It provides a
90 See COMMENTARY ON UN CONVENTION, supra note 31, at 94–98 (discussing
each article); see also Bryan Y. Lee, The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities and Its Impact upon Involuntary Civil Commitment of Individuals with
Developmental Disabilities, 44 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 393, 413–30 (2011) (discussing
the changes that ratifying states need to make in their domestic involuntary civil
commitment laws to comply with CRPD mandates).
91 Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”:
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of
Guardianship Law, 117 PA ST. L. REV. 1159, 1173–74 (2013) [hereinafter Perlin, Striking
for the Guardians]; see also Kanter, supra note 14, at 76:

[T]he CRPD challenges policy makers, scholars, advocates, and activists to
reframe the meaning of equality and inclusion for people with disabilities by
requiring States Parties to take affirmative steps to ensure equality for people
with disabilities that go beyond traditional notions of equal treatment as well
as equal opportunities, specifically in the employment context.
92 See, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting Through the Lens of
Mental Disability: The Proposed International Convention on Protection and Promotion
of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 181, 189–91
(2005) [hereinafter Dhir, Human Rights].
93 See generally Michael L. Perlin, “Abandoned Love”: The Impact of Wyatt v.
Stickney on the Intersection Between International Human Rights and Domestic Mental
Disability Law, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 121, 127 (2011) (discussing the social model
framework of the CRPD and how post Wyatt lawyers began to “replicate” the decision
and transform mental disability law from medical to legal model). On the tension
between the two models, see Piers Gooding, Supported Decision-Making: A Rights-Based
Disability Concept and Its Implications for Mental Health Law, 20 PSYCHIATRY,
PSYCHOL. & L. 431 (2013) [hereinafter Gooding, Supported Decision-Making]. On the
ways that aspects of mental disability law were traditionally premised on a medical
model, see Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Law, 85 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2010). On how the medical model “is in direct violation” of the CRPD,
see Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific: The Need for a
Disability Rights Tribunal to Give Life to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1,14 (2012).
94 See, e.g., Janet E. Lord et al., Lessons from the Experience of U.N. Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Global
Health Governance, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 564, 564 (2010); Kaiser, supra note 43.
95 Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, Social Rights and the Relational
Value of the Rights to Participate in Sport, Recreation, and Play, 27 B.U. INT’L L J. 249,
256 (2009); see also Ronald McCallum, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of
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framework for insuring that mental health laws “fully recognise
the rights of those with mental illnesses.”96
As we noted earlier, one of the core issues that must be
confronted directly if we ever can meaningfully eradicate sanism is
the lack of adequate, independent and dedicated counsel for
individuals facing involuntary civil commitment.97 This remains
one of the most critical issues in seeking to bring life to
international human rights law in a mental disability law context.
The CRPD mandates that “States Parties shall take appropriate
measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the
support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.”98
Elsewhere, the convention commands:
States Parties shall ensure effective access to justice for persons with
disabilities on an equal basis with others, including through the
provision of procedural and age-appropriate accommodations, in order
to facilitate their effective role as direct and indirect participants,
including as witnesses, in all legal proceedings, including at
investigative and other preliminary stages.99

The question remains: will this Article be honored in nations
that have ratified the CRPD, and will it, authentically, have a
major impact on the extent to which the entire CRPD affects
the individuals in question.100 If and only if, there is a
mechanism for the appointment of dedicated counsel,101 can this
dream become a reality.
The ratification of the CRPD is the most important
development in institutional human rights law for persons with
mental disabilities. The CRPD is detailed, comprehensive,

Persons with Disabilities: Some Reflections (Mar. 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1563883 [https://perma.cc/29V3-LDKN].
96 Bernadette McSherry, International Trends in Mental Health Laws:
Introduction, 26 LAW CONTEXT 1, 8 (2008). But see Kristen Booth Glen, Introducing a
“New” Human Right: Learning from Others, Bringing Legal Capacity Home, COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV., Spring 2017, at 1, 36 (“[M]edical models still hold particular sway
when it comes to psychosocial disabilities such as schizophrenia, depression, and bipolar
disorder.”) (citing MENTAL HEALTH EUR., AUTONOMY, CHOICE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING FOR PERSONS WITH PSYCHOSOCIAL DISABILITIES: MHE
POSITION PAPER ON ARTICLE 12 UNCRPD ON LEGAL CAPACITY 5 (2017)).
97 Perlin, supra note 59, at 340–42.
98 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 12, ¶ 3.
99 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 13, ¶ 1.
100 Michael L. Perlin, “I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral,
My Trial”: Global Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil
Commitment Cases, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 253 (2008).
101 On the significance of “cause lawyers” in the development of mental disability
law in the United States, see Michael A. Stein et al., Cause Lawyering for People With
Disabilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1661–62 (2010) (reviewing SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS,
LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009)).
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integrated and the result of a careful drafting process.102 It seeks to
reverse the results of centuries of oppressive behavior and attitudes
that have stigmatized persons with disabilities. Its goal is clear: “to
promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all
human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with
disabilities, and to promote respect for their inherent dignity.”103
Whether this will actually happen is still far from a settled matter.
The United States remains one of the lone members of
the UN to have not yet ratified the CRPD.104 In December 2012,
the ratification of the CRPD fell short by five votes, out of
concerns that the CRPD would threaten national sovereignty.105
One of the main arguments against ratification of the CRPD by
Republican members of the Senate was that disability rights
were already guaranteed by the ADA, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and by the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act.106 Thus, by ratifying the CRPD,
the United States would be exposing itself to risky international
monitoring when these adequate protections were already in
place.107 But this argument failed to acknowledge that a federalism
reservation108 would have “alleviate[d] any national sovereignty
concerns” by making it clear that the CRPD would not necessarily
intrude upon domestic law.109 It also failed to recognize the
102 See HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY ADVOCACY (Maya Sabatello & Marianne
Schulze eds., 2014) (describing various perspectives on the involvement of civil society
in the drafting of the Convention).
103 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 1.
104 CRPD and Optional Protocol Signatures and Ratifications, U.N. (May 2016),
http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/2016/Map/DESA-Enable_4496R6_May16.pdf.
For discussions of Canada’s ratification of the CRPD, see Ravi Malhotra & Robin F.
Hansen, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and
Its Implications for the Equality Rights of Canadians with Disabilities: The Case of
Education, 29 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 73, 83–90 (2011); Mona Paré, Of Minors and
the Mentally Ill: Re-Positioning Perspectives on Consent to Health Care, 29 WINDSOR Y.B.
ACCESS JUST. 107, 116–18 (2011).
105 LUISA BLANCHFIELD & CYNTHIA BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42749,
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:
ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION DEBATE 1–8 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R42749.pdf [https://perma.cc/74EC-DNRX].
106 Candace Farmer, Can the U.S. Use a Reservation to Alleviate Sovereignty
Concerns Regarding the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities?, 43 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 249, 266–67 (2014).
107 See id. at 267.
108 A reservation is a “unilateral statement . . . made by a State . . . when
signing . . . a treaty . . . whereby the State . . . purports to exclude or to modify the legal
effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.” Id at 271
(quoting Int’1 Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, 63d Sess. (2011), United Nations Guide
to Practice on Reservations to Treaties). For the CRPD, the Obama Administration
proposed a federalism reservation which stated that “US obligations under [the] CRPD
are limited to those measures appropriate to the federal system, such as the enforcement
of the [ADA].” BLANCHFIELD & BROWN, supra note 105, at 5.
109 Farmer, supra note 106, at 270.
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shortcomings of the ADA110 and how the CRPD could be used “to
expand the rights of people with disabilities beyond civil and
political rights to economic, social, and cultural rights” beyond
what is guaranteed or aspired to under domestic law.111
Notwithstanding the fact that Congress has not yet ratified
the CRPD, the fact that it was signed by President Obama in 2012
means that the CRPD still has weight and influence over domestic
policy.112 The signing of the Convention triggers the application of
the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties “which requires
signatories ‘to refrain from acts which would defeat the Disability
Convention’s object and purpose.’”113 Importantly, New York state
courts have relied on this and have cited the CRPD with approval
in cases involving guardianship matters.114
Surrogate Judge Kristen Booth Glen thus granted the
CRPD “persuasive weight’ in interpreting our own laws and
constitutional protections.”115 In a later decision, New York State
Surrogate Judge Margarita Lopez Torres relied again on
international human rights law (including the CRPD) in a
decision that rejected a guardianship appointment petition, in a
110 See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from
Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the
Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 413–14 (1997) (arguing that “special
treatment” approaches to interpreting the ADA have led to problems with enforcing the
law); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 102 (1999) (noting that courts’ refusal to defer, as required,
to agency interpretations of the ADA led to a pro-defendant bias in litigation).
111 Arlene S. Kanter, The Americans with Disabilities Act at 25 Years: Lessons to
Learn from the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 819,
883 (2015).
112 See Michelle Diament, Obama Urges Senate to Ratify Disability Treaty,
DISABILITY SCOOP (May 18, 2012), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2012/05/18/obamaurges-senate-treaty/15654/ [https://perma.cc/4FPN-X7ME]. Because the Senate lacked a
super-majority of votes, it failed to ratify the CRPD on December 4, 2012. See The
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.S. INT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITIES,
http://usicd.org/index.cfm/crpd [https://perma.cc/3MYQ-C9M2]. See generally Perlin &
Schriver, Drugs at Your Command, supra note 8, at 387.
113 See In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 (Sur. Ct. 2010) (citing Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treatises art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331), as discussed
in Henry Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with Limited
Competency in Guardianship Proceedings, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 331, 362–
63 (2011).
114 See, e.g., Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d at 435 (holding due process required that
the guardianship appointment be subject to a requirement of periodic reporting and
review); In re Guardianship of Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (Sur. Ct. 2012) (holding
that substantive due process requirement of adherence to principal of least restrictive
alternative applied to guardianships sought for mentally persons). There is nothing new
or radical about the use of international human rights law in U.S. courts. See generally
Michael W. Lewis & Peter Margulies, Interpretations of IHL in Tribunals of the United
States, in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN JUDICIAL AND QUASIJUDICIAL BODIES 415 (Derek Jinks et al. eds., 2014) (demonstrating how U.S. courts have
been interpreting international human rights law ever since the nation was founded).
115 Dameris L., 956 N.Y.S.2d at 855; see Perlin, Striking for the Guardians,
supra note 91, at 1178 n.97 (discussing Dameris L. in this context).
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case of a woman with Down’s Syndrome living in the community.
Concluded Judge Torres:
The perfunctory appointment of a plenary guardian based upon
medical certifications or diagnostic tests alone, without careful and
meaningful inquiry into the individual’s functional capacity, relies
upon the incorrect assumption that the mere status of intellectual
disability provides sufficient basis to wholly remove an individual’s
legal right to make decisions for himself. This approach is contrary to
established conventions of international human rights.116

Here, Judge Torres incorporated a state task force’s finding that
“[c]ommunity integration includes the ability of people with
disabilities to make their own choices to the maximum extent
possible.” She added that “guardianship removes the legal
decision-making authority of an individual with a disability and
should . . . only be imposed if necessary and in the least restrictive
manner,”117 relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s anti-institutional
segregation ADA decision of Olmstead v. L.C.118 She also stressed
that, in coming to her decision, she found the CRPD to provide
“persuasive authority for the foundational premise that ‘persons
with disabilities have a right to recognition everywhere as
persons before the law’ and ‘persons with disabilities enjoy legal
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.’”119
In an even more recent decision, another New York State
Surrogate Court judge found that an indigent adult—subject to
guardianship proceedings upon allegations of incapacitation—had a
right to assigned counsel. The Court reasoned that her fundamental
liberty interests—including the right to privacy, the right to
determine her residence, and the right to decide on medical
treatment—would be profoundly affected,120 especially given the fact
that guardianship proceedings were of unlimited duration and
scope, and had no provision for independent review or
examination.121 In finding that individuals living with disabilities
are no less entitled to these constitutional guarantees of due process
than persons who are not alleged to be under disability, the court
116 In re Guardian of Michelle M., No. 2014, 2016 WL 3981204, at *3 (Sur. Ct. 2016);
see generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 16, at §§ 2-8, 2-82–2-83.
117 Michelle M., 2016 WL 3981204, at *3.
118 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 591–92 (1999) (state programs for persons
with disabilities must be administered in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
individual’s unique needs). On the relationship between the CRPD and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, see Kanter, supra note 14, at 80–85, and on the advantages of the
human rights approach of the CRPD, see Kanter, supra note 111, at 823–24.
119 Michelle M., 2016 WL 3981204, at *3 (quoting CRPD, supra note 27, at art.
12(1)-(2)).
120 In re Zhuo, 42 N.Y.S.3d 530, 532 (Sur. Ct. 2016).
121 Id. at 536.
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pointedly added, “[p]ersons with disabilities have a right to
recognition everywhere as persons before the law . . . [and] enjoy
legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life.”122
Some argue that the enactment of the ADA made it
unnecessary for the United States to ratify the CRPD.123 We
reject that argument in toto. The ADA and the CRPD are neither
identical nor are they mutually exclusive. Although the ADA has
resulted in greater access to services, buildings, and programs
for persons with disabilities in the United States, it has failed to
live up to its goal of destroying the “wall of exclusion” for persons
with disabilities.124 The CRPD goes further than the ADA in the
protection of rights for persons with disabilities, to not just
prohibit discrimination but to ensure substantive equality
including civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights,125
and by including prescriptive rights (“the right to”) as well as
proscriptive rights (“the right to be free from”).126
The CRPD categorically affirms the social model of
disability127 by describing it as a condition arising from “interaction
between persons with impairments and attitudinal and
environmental barriers that hinders their full and effective
participation in society on an equal basis with others” instead of
inherent limitations.128 Further, it reconceptualizes mental health
rights as disability rights,129 and extends existing human rights to
take into account the specific experiences of persons with
disabilities.130 To this end, it calls for “[r]espect for inherent
122 Id. at 532–33 (quoting CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 12(1)-(2)). The CRPD is
also cited with approval in Proceeding for the Appointment of Guardian For Leon
Pursuant to SCPA Article 17–A, 53 Misc.3d 1204(A), 43 N.Y.S. 3d 769 (Surrogate’s Ct.
2016, at *1 (“Persons with disabilities have a right to recognition everywhere as persons
before the law . . . [and] enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects
of life.” (citing Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/611,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/611, art. 12 (Dec. 6, 2006))).
123 See BLANCHFIELD & BROWN, supra note 105, at 12.
124 Kanter, supra note 111, at 822.
125 Id. at 848–51.
126 See Perlin & Schriver, Drugs at Your Command, supra note 8, at 386; Robert
J. Quinn, Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile’s New Model, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 905, 920
(1994) (noting the significance of the inclusion of proscriptive and prescriptive rights in
human rights treaties in general); Gooding, Supported Decision-Making, supra note 93,
at 434 (explaining how the CRPD combines these two categories of rights).
127 Lord et al., supra note 94, at 568. The CRPD has also been used as a basis
for rethinking New York guardianships for persons with intellectual disabilities. See
Karen Andreasian et al., Revisiting S.C.P.A. 17-A: Guardianship for People with
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 18 CUNY L. REV. 287, 329–31 (2015).
128 CRPD, supra note 27, at pmbl. ¶ (e), art. 1.
129 Phillip Fennel, Human Rights, Bioethics, and Mental Disorder, 27 MED. & L.
95, 106 (2008).
130 Megret, Disability Rights, supra note 25, at 504; see PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 143–55.
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dignity”131 and “[n]on-discrimination.”132 As noted earlier,
subsequent articles declare “[f]reedom from torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,”133 “[f]reedom
from exploitation, violence and abuse,”134 the right to “liberty and
security of the person,”135 and a right to protection of the “integrity
of the person.”136
B.

Issues of Dignity137

We must next consider the significance of dignity in its
inquiry and its relationship to international human rights law.138
When the United Nations embarked upon the drafting process
of the CRPD, it established an ad hoc committee “to consider
proposals for a comprehensive and integral international
convention to promote and protect the rights and dignity of
persons with disabilities.”139 This was consonant with the
perspectives of observers such as Professor Aaron Dhir:
“Degrading living conditions, coerced ‘treatment,’ scientific
experimentation, seclusion, restraints—the list of violations to
the dignity and autonomy of those diagnosed with mental
disabilities is both long and egregious.”140
As ratified, the CRPD calls for “[r]espect for inherent
dignity.”141 It requires State parties “to adopt immediate,
effective and appropriate measures . . . [t]o raise awareness
throughout society, including at the family level, regarding
persons with disabilities, and to foster respect for the rights and
dignity of persons with disabilities.”142 The Preamble
characterizes “discrimination against any person on the basis of
disability [as] a violation of the inherent dignity and worth of the

CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 3(a).
Id. at art. 3(b).
133 Id. at art. 15.
134 Id. at art. 16.
135 Id. at art. 14.
136 Id. at art. 17. On the possible application of these article to persons with
mental disabilities in prison, see Perlin, God Said, supra note 8, at 486.
137 This section is generally adapted from PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 19, at Chapter 2.
138 We know, by way of example, that “[p]erceptions of systemic fairness are
driven, in large part, by ‘the degree to which people judge that they are treated with
dignity and respect.’” Michael L. Perlin, “Who Will Judge the Many When the Game is
Through?”: Considering the Profound Differences between Mental Health Courts and
“Traditional” Involuntary Civil Commitment Courts, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 937, 955
(2018) (quoting Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 415 (2000)).
139 G.A. Res. 56/168, at ¶ 1 (Feb. 26, 2002).
140 Dhir, Human Rights, supra note 92, at 182.
141 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 3(a).
142 Id. at art. 8.
131
132
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human person.”143 And these provisions are consistent with the
entire CRPD’s “rights-based approach focusing on individual
dignity,”144 placing the responsibility on the State “to tackle
socially created obstacles in order to ensure full respect for the
dignity and equal rights of all persons.”145
Professor Michael Stein puts it well this way: A “dignitary
perspective compels societies to acknowledge that persons with
disabilities are valuable because of their inherent human worth.”146
In Professor Cees Maris’s summary: “The Convention’s object is to
ensure disabled persons enjoy all human rights with dignity.”147 In
his testimony in support of the CRPD, Eric Rosenthal, the director
of Mental Disability Rights International, shared with Congress
his observations of the treatment of institutionalized persons with
mental disabilities in Central and Eastern European nations:
“[w]hen governments deny their citizens basic human dignity and
autonomy, when they subject them to extremes of suffering, when
they segregate them from society-we call these violations of
fundamental human rights.”148
Dignity issues self-evidently affect institutionalization
issues as well.149 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has held that a state welfare department regulation requiring
certain patients to receive services in the segregated setting of a
nursing home, rather than in their own homes, violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In the course of its
opinion, it read the ADA to intend to ensure that “qualified
individuals receive services in a manner consistent with basic
human dignity rather than a manner which shunts them aside,

Id. at pmbl ¶ (h).
Dhir, Human Rights, supra note 92, at 195.
145 GERARD QUINN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY: THE CURRENT USE
AND FUTURE POTENTIAL OF UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS IN THE
CONTEXT OF DISABILITY 14 (2002).
146 Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. REV. 75, 106 (2007).
147 Cees Maris, A ≠ A: Or, Freaky Justice, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133, 1156 (2010).
148 Sally Chaffin, Challenging the United States Position on a United Nations
Convention on Disability, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 121, 140 (2005) (alteration
in original) (quoting International Disability Rights: The Proposed UN Convention:
Hearing before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, 108th Cong. (Mar. 30, 2004)).
149 See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008), for the role of dignity in
the criminal trial process in cases involving criminal defendants with mental disabilities,
as discussed in PERLIN & CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 15, § 13-3-2.4.
143
144
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hides, and ignores them.”150 Importantly, such values have been
affirmed in other nations as well.151
Further, the human rights approach embodied in the
CRPD promotes a basis for intervention that is more careoriented152 rather than the violence-preventative basis that now
exists in the United States and elsewhere in the world.153 “Waiting
for treatment until persons are deemed a danger of violence to
themselves or others is a denial of human dignity.”154 Any
intervention must be the least restrictive, must take into account
the person’s preferences,155 and must ensure that any potential
trauma be diminished.156
Dignity means that people “possess an intrinsic worth
that should be recognized and respected, and that they should
not be subjected to treatment by the state that is inconsistent
with their intrinsic worth.”157 There are four principles that can
strengthen the application of dignity in judicial decisions:
150 Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 327, 335 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Michael L.
Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, “Is It More Than Dodging Lions and Wastin’ Time”?
Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in Individual
Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 114, 118–19, 132 (1996)
(on how hearings in right to refuse treatment cases can enhance dignity values); Perlin,
Make Promises, supra note 17, at 961–62 (on the ADA and dignity in general).
151 Courts in Canada have similarly stressed the role of dignitarian values in
cases involving the autonomy of persons with mental disabilities: “Mentally ill persons
are not to be stigmatized because of the nature of their illness or disability; nor should
they be treated as persons of lesser status or dignity. Their right to personal autonomy
and self-determination is no less significant, and is entitled to no less protection . . . .”
Fleming v. Reid [1991], 4 O.R. 3d 74, 86–87 (Can. Ont. C.A.); see also Dhir, Relationship
of Force, supra note 43, at 109 (discussing Fleming). Professor Malhotra has a less
sanguine view of other Canadian cases. See, e.g., Malhotra, supra note 4, at 29 (stating
Canada Supreme Court disability rights decisions in Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703, 2000 SCC 28 (QL), and in Auton v.
British Columbia, 2004 SCC 78, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657, were “problematic decisions with
negative impacts for persons with disabilities”). On the role of Canadian provincial
legislatures in matters involving the rights of persons subject to the civil commitment
process, see Isabel Grant & Peter J. Carver, PS v Ontario: Rethinking the Role of the
Charter in Civil Commitment, 53 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 999, 1031 (2016) (“[D]oing nothing
is the more likely response of most provincial legislators, as the rights of civilly detained
individuals have rarely been given priority.”).
152 On how the CRPD may be used as a vehicle to promote continuity of care for
persons with mental disabilities, see Weinstein & Perlin, supra note 18.
153 Jonathan Simon & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Dignifying Madness: Rethinking
Commitment Law in an Age of Mass Incarceration, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 40 (2015).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 41.
156 See, e.g., Mehgan Gallagher & Michael L. Perlin, “The Pain I Rise Above”:
How International Human Rights Can Best Realize the Needs of Persons with TraumaRelated Mental Disabilities, 29 FLA. J. INT’L L. 271 (2017).
157 Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and
the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 415 (2009) (quoting Gerald Neuman,
Human Dignity in the United States Constitution, in ZUR AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMS
250 (Dieter Simon & Manfred Weiss eds., 2000)). Although some “[c]ritics dismiss dignity
as a legal concept on the ground that it is too indeterminate and subjective to provide
judgments or even guidance to judges and other legal interpreters,” Simon &
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(1) “[t]he application of human dignity in judicial decisions should be
based on a written law”;
(2) “[j]udges should try to define what human dignity is and be
explicit about its meaning”;
(3) “[j]udges should attempt to use human dignity consistently in the
same rulings and in future decisions”;
(4) “[h]uman dignity should advance human rights rather than limit
them.”158

Citing to the CRPD can alleviate some of the ambiguity that arises
when concepts of dignity are raised in judicial decisions.159 By
employing these principles, court proceedings are more likely to
have beneficial outcomes leading to a rejection of sanist attitudes.
C.

Controversial Aspects of the CRPD

This is not to say that the CRPD is without controversy,
even in the disability rights community. By way of example, does
Article 14(1)(b)’s requirement that those with disabilities “are
not deprived of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily”160 protect
against all institutionalization,161 or, in some circumstances, is
involuntary hospitalization permissible if an individual poses a
serious risk of harm to himself or others?162 Is the High
Rosenbaum, supra note 153, at 23, we reject that interpretation. See Perlin & Weinstein,
But You Have No Choice, supra note 74, at 79 (explaining why adherence to therapeutic
jurisprudence “is further demanded as a matter of dignity”).
158 Doron Shultziner, Human Dignity in Judicial Decisions: Principles of
Application and the Rule of Law, 25 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 435, 448–49 (2017).
159 See Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “She’s Nobody’s Child/The Law
Can’t Touch Her at All”: Seeking to Bring Dignity to Legal Proceedings Involving
Juveniles, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 79, 79 n.6 (2018) (alterations in original):
The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that all persons possessed dignity by
virtue of their basic humanity, at least since McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 343 (1943) (“[a] democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all
men is central, naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement
process”), and continues to write about it to this day; see, e.g., Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (finding “[fundamental] liberties extend to
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”).
CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 14 (1)(a).
See Vandana Peterson, Understanding Disability Under the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Its Impact on International Refugee and
Asylum Law, 42 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 687, 697 (2014).
162 Rebecca Zarett, To Work and to Love: How International Human Rights Law Can
Be Used to Improve Mental Health in the United States, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 191, 208 (2016);
see, e.g., Sascha Mira Callaghan & Christopher Ryan, Is There a Future for Involuntary
Treatment in Rights-Based Mental Health Law?, 21 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 747, 747 (2014)
(arguing that the CRPD does allow for involuntary treatment in some instances, and that
“failing to account for it in law will jeopardise rights more than it protects them”).
160
161

898

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:3

Commissioner’s conclusion that, “[i]n the area of criminal law,
recognition of the legal capacity of persons with disabilities
requires abolishing a defense based on the negation of criminal
responsibility because of the existence of a mental or intellectual
disability,”163 or does the CRPD demand the retention of the
insanity defense?164 These and other like questions reflect the
complexity of the issues raised by this CRPD.165
A controversial topic regarding the CRPD—one related to
both sanism and therapeutic jurisprudence principles166—is
whether Article 12 completely abolishes guardianships.167
Article 12 of the CRPD guarantees that persons with disabilities
have the right to recognition everywhere before the law.168 The
International Disability Alliance, a network of global and
regional organizations of persons with disabilities, has argued
that, under the CRPD, the following must be abolished:
(1) “plenary guardianship”; (2) “unlimited time frames for exercise of
guardianship”; (3) “the legal status of guardianship as permitting any person
to override the decisions of another”; (4) “any individual guardianship
arrangement upon a person’s request to be released from it”; (5) “any
substituted decision-making mechanism that overrides a person’s own will,
whether it is concerned with a single or a long-term arrangement”; and (6) “any
other substituted decision-making mechanisms, unless the person does not
object, and there is a concomitant requirement to establish supports in a
person’s life so they can eventually exercise full legal capacity”.169

Whether or not Article 12 definitively abolishes guardianship,
Article 12(3) reflects “the critical insight that even people with the
most significant disabilities have legal capacity and are covered by
the CRPD.”170 Article 12 ensures measures relating to the exercise of
capacity must have safeguards that “respect the rights, will and
preferences of the person, are free of conflicts of interest and undue
influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s
circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are subject
to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial
163 Human Rights Council, Annual Report of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and
the Secretary-General, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/48 (Jan. 26, 2009).
164 See Perlin, God Said, supra note 8, at 518.
165 See, e.g., Perlin & Szeli, supra note 24, at 251.
166 See infra Part IV, for a full discussion of the meaning of therapeutic
jurisprudence in this context.
167 See INT’L DISABILITY ALL., PRINCIPLES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF CRPD, ARTICLE
12, at ¶ 17 (2013), http://www.internationaldisabilityalliance.org/resources/article-12-legalcapacity-principles-implementation [https://perma.cc/RW8F-Q4T5] [hereinafter IDRA]. On this
question generally, see Perlin, Striking for the Guardians, supra note 91, at 1173–74.
168 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 12.
169 IDRA, supra note 167, at ¶ 17.
170 Robert D. Dinerstein, Implementing Legal Capacity Under Article 12 of the
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Difficult Road from
Guardianship to Supported Decision-making, 19 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 8, 9 (2012).

2019]

VOICES IN THE NIGHT

899

authority or judicial body.”171 “This mandate screams out for a
universal overhaul of guardianship law and practice.”172
D.

Supported Decision-Making173

While the issue of the complete abolishment of
guardianship under the CRPD remains controversial,174 the
CRPD does mandate that if intervention is necessary, it must
take the form of supported decision-making rather than
substituted decision-making.175 As discussed above, Article 12 of
the CRPD underscores the importance of legal capacity as an
inalienable right and provides for safeguards to ensure that a
person’s capacity is not subject to abuse.176 “Instead of
paternalistic guardianship laws . . . the CRPD’s supporteddecision making model recognizes first, that all people have the
right to make decisions and choices about their own lives.”177
Supported decision-making is also reinforced in U.S. law
under the ADA.178 Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination
based on disabilities by public entities in their services, programs,
or activities.179 Guardianships unnecessarily isolate persons with
psychosocial impairments.180 This unjustified isolation can be

171 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 12; see also Leslie Salzman, Rethinking
Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration
Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157, 161,
232 n.232 (2010) [hereinafter Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship].
172 Perlin, Striking for the Guardians, supra note 91, at 1190.
173 Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, “Said I ‘But You Have No Choice”: Why
a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client’s Decision About Mental Health Treatment Even if it
is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 73, 79 (2016).
174 See Arlene S. Kanter & Yotam Tolub, The Fight for Personhood, Legal
Capacity, and Equal Recognition Under Law for People with Disabilities in Israel and
Beyond, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 557, 559 (2017).
175 Id. at 559–60; see also CPRD, supra note 27, at art. 12.
176 Robert Dinerstein et al., Emerging International Trends and Practices in
Guardianship Law for People with Disabilities, 22 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 435, 444 (2016).
177 Arlene S. Kanter, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities and Its Implications for the Rights of Elderly People Under
International Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 527, 563 (2009).
178 Supported decision making incorporates the least restrictive alternative
doctrine, and is based on the concept that no one makes decisions in a vacuum. Supported
decision making can come in many different forms depending on the needs and abilities of the
individual. It can include health care proxies, powers of attorney, or contract agreements. See
generally Supported Decision Making N.Y., What is Supported Decision-Making?, SDMNY,
https://sdmny.org/about-sdmny/about-sdm/ [https://perma.cc/ZA97-3PGU].
179 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006).
180 Leslie Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness—A Legal and
Appropriate Alternative?, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 289 (2011) [hereinafter
Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness]. The social model of disability
“places the responsibility squarely on society (and not on the individual with a disability)
to remove the physical and attitudinal barriers that ‘disable’ people with various
impairments, and prevent them from exercising their rights and fully integrating into
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viewed as discrimination based on a disability in violation of the
ADA.181 A declaration of incapacity by any court can lead to
feelings of helplessness and loss of control, which are detrimental
to a person’s mental well-being and create feelings of shame and
humiliation.182 Substituted decision-making can lead to
unjustified confinement for persons with mental illness.183 When
attorneys use substituted judgment in making legal decisions for
their clients, “there are no checks and balances.”184
Supported decision-making allows individuals with
limitations to receive support in order to understand relevant
information and available choices in order to make decisions
based on their preferences, instead of completely taking away
their ability to make any decisions.185 It is important to consider
the context in which individuals face decisions and not just the
personal characteristics of the individual with a disability.186
Education and training are also important for all parties
involved in supported decision-making, including attorneys,
judges, clients, and state parties.187 Again, the extent to which
the ratification of the CRPD actually affects our history of
stigmatization and marginalization will, in many ways, be the
bellwether of the CRPD’s actual success. We turn now to the
school of legal thought known as therapeutic jurisprudence as a
lens through which we will examine all the relevant issues.
IV.

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE188

One of the most important legal theoretical developments
of the past three decades has been the creation and dynamic
society.” Arlene S. Kanter, The Law: What’s Disability Studies Got to Do With It or an
Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 427 (2011).
181 Kevin M. Cremin, Challenges to Institutionalization: The Definition of
“Institution” and the Future of Olmstead Litigation, 17 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 143, 152 (2012).
182 Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship, supra note 172, at 169, 184; see also
Perlin & Weinstein, Friend to the Martyr, supra note 18, at 38.
183 Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 180, at 290.
184 Josephine Ross, Autonomy Versus a Client’s Best Interests: The Defense Lawyer’s
Dilemma When Mentally Ill Clients Seek to Control Their Defense, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343,
1372 (1998). See generally Perlin & Weinstein, But You Have No Choice, supra note 74.
185 Salzman, Guardianship for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 180, at 306.
186 Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to
Guardianship?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111, 1153 (2013).
187 Id.
188 This section is generally adapted from Perlin & Lynch, Sexless Patients,
supra note 19; Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “In the Wasteland of Your Mind”:
Criminology, Scientific Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 304 (2016);
and Perlin & Weinstein, Friend to the Martyr, supra note 18. Further, it distills the work
of one of the authors over the past twenty-five years, beginning with Michael L. Perlin,
What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993). For full
historical discussions see generally Michael L. Perlin, “Have You Seen Dignity?:” The
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growth of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ).189 Initially employed in
cases involving individuals with mental disabilities, but
subsequently expanded far beyond that narrow area, therapeutic
jurisprudence presents a new model for assessing the impact of
case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent,
the law can have therapeutic or anti‐therapeutic consequences.190
The ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine
whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should
be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not
subordinating due process principles.191
Therapeutic jurisprudence “asks us to look at law as it
actually impacts people’s lives”192 and focuses on the law’s
influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.193 It
suggests that “law should value psychological health, should
strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences
whenever possible, and, when consistent with other values
served by law, should attempt to bring about healing and
wellness.”194 By way of example, therapeutic jurisprudence “aims
to offer social science evidence that limits the use of the
incompetency label by narrowly defining its use and minimizing
its psychological and social disadvantage.”195 In recent years,
scholars have considered a vast range of topics through a
therapeutic jurisprudence lens, including, but not limited to, all
aspects of mental disability law, domestic relations law, criminal
Story of the Development of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 27 N.Z. U. L. REV. 1135 (2017);
Michael L. Perlin, “Changing of the Guards:” David Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
and the Transformation of Legal Scholarship, 63 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 3 (2019).
189 See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996);
BRUCE .J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005).
See generally David B. Wexler, Mental Health Law and the Seeds of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, in THE ROOTS OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: A NARRATIVE HISTORY
78 (Thomas Grisso & Stanley Brodsky eds., 2018); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17 (2008).
190 For a transnational perspective, see Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental
Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW
91 (Ian Freckelton & Kerry Peterson eds., 2006).
191 See, e.g., Perlin, They Keep It All Hid, supra note 4, at 875; Perlin, Best
Friend, supra note 8, at 751; Perlin, Making Love, supra note 8, at 510 n.139.
192 Bruce J. Winick, Forward: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on
Dealing with Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
193 David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft
Spots and Strategies, in DENNIS P. STOLLE ET AL., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 (2000).
194 Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in
INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds. 2003).
195 Claire B. Steinberger, Persistence and Change in the Life of the Law: Can
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Make a Difference?, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 55, 65 (2003).
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law and procedure, employment law, gay rights law, and tort
law.196 As Ian Freckelton has noted, “[I]t is a tool for gaining a
new and distinctive perspective utilizing socio-psychological
insights into the law and its applications.”197
TJ is also part of a growing comprehensive movement in
the law towards establishing more humane and psychologically
optimal ways of handling legal issues collaboratively, creatively,
and respectfully.198 These alternative approaches optimize the
psychological well-being of individuals, relationships, and
communities dealing with a legal matter, and acknowledge
concerns beyond strict legal rights, duties, and obligations. In its
aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and
promote well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence has been
described as “a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of
law . . . a movement towards a more distinctly relational
approach to the practice of law . . . which emphasises
psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism.”199 That
is, “[therapeutic jurisprudence] supports an ethic of care.”200
One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is
a commitment to dignity. Professor Amy Ronner describes the “three
Vs: voice, validation and voluntary participation,”201 arguing:
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a
sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that
litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and
taken seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant feels a sense of
validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a
sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome.
Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in
which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive.
Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily
partook in the very process that engendered the end result or the very
196 See, e.g., Perlin, Things Have Changed, supra note 8, at 543–45; see also
Roberto P. Aponte Toro, Sanity in International Relations: An Experience in Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 659, 660–61 (1999) (on its potential
application to international law issues in general).
197 Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented:
The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 576 (2008).
198 Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within The
Comprehensive Law Movement, in STOLLE, supra note 193, at 465.
199 Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical
Framework, 8 J.L. & MED. 328, 329–30 (2001).
200 Michael Perlin, “I’ve Got My Mind Made Up”: How Judicial Teleology in
Cases Involving Biologically Based Evidence Violates Therapeutic Jurisprudence 27
(unpublished manuscript) (Mar. 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2930061 [https://
perma.cc/3R72-DN24] (citing Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law
Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605–07 (2006)).
201 Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV.
601, 627 (2008).
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judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate healing
and bring about improved behavior in the future. In general, human
beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least
participating in, their own decisions. 202

TJ principles frequently converge with many of the principles
underlying international human rights protections for those
with mental disabilities, such as the protection of liberty against
arbitrary deprivation and a commitment to procedural
fairness,203 and a need for robust counsel.204 As stated earlier, the
CRPD declares a right to “[f]reedom from . . . degrading
treatment or punishment,”205 and a “[r]espect for inherent
dignity.”206 It promotes “awareness throughout society, including
at the family level, regarding persons with disabilities, and to foster
respect for the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities.”207 An
understanding of dignity is absolutely central to an understanding
of the intersection between international human rights and mental
disability law.208 TJ can provide insights on how international
human rights principles should be applied “to achieve therapeutic
aims and avoid antitherapeutic effects.”209
The “three Vs” articulated by Professor Ronner are all
critical aspects of the ways that TJ meshes with the CRPD. If
the CRPD is truly followed, persons with mental disabilities
will—finally—have a voice and be validated. And it is far more
likely that they will act voluntarily and not under the
compulsion of others.
We believe that TJ has the best capacity to rid the law of
sanism and pretextuality.210 Elsewhere, in a book-length treatment
of the insanity defense, one of the co-authors has written:
202 Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94–95 (2002);
see generally AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 23
(2010) (discussing the “three V’s”).
203 See Winick, supra note 24, at 543.
204 See Juan Ramirez, Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville’s
Tribute to the Sixth Amendment, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 103, 119 (2004) (characterizing the
right to counsel as “the core of therapeutic jurisprudence”).
205 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 15; see also Charles R. Beitz, Human Dignity
in the Theory of Human Rights: Nothing but a Phrase?, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 259,
289 (2013) (discussing the relationship between human dignity and the “importance
of . . . specific protections . . . such as the prohibition of torture and cruel or degrading
treatment [in international human rights treaties and conventions]”).
206 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 3.
207 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 8.
208 Beitz, supra note 205, at 281 (noting that a special class of “dignitary harms”
denies individuals “the capacity for dignified conduct”).
209 Winick, supra note 24, at 544.
210 In the specific context of criminal law and procedure, on this question, see
Michael L. Perlin, “Infinity Goes up on Trial”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and the Representation
of Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 16 QUT L. REV. 106, 107–08 (2016).
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[W]e must rigorously apply therapeutic jurisprudence principles to each
aspect of the insanity defense. We need to take what we learn from
therapeutic jurisprudence to strip away sanist behavior, pretextual
reasoning and teleological decision making from the insanity defense
process. This would enable us to confront the pretextual use of social
science data in an open and meaningful way.211

We believe the same principles apply to the subject matter of
this article as well. We believe that the adoption of TJ principles
will best reflect the “ethic of care” that has been tragically
missing from the ways that persons with mental disabilities
have been treated, domestically and internationally.
Janet Lord and her colleagues focused on the significance of
“voice accountability” in the drafting of the CRPD.212 One of the coauthors has previously written that “[t]he CRPD is a document
that resonates with TJ values,”213 and we believe that remains true.
The CRPD empowers persons with mental disabilities, and “one of
the major aims of TJ is explicitly the empowerment of those whose
lives are regulated by the legal system.”214 The application of TJ, by
promoting dignity and ensuring therapeutic effects in the
implementation of the CRPD, and by mandating “voice,”215
enhances the likelihood that sanism will be eradicated,216 and that
the “silenced” voices will finally, if tardily, be heard.217
211 PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 57, at
443; see also Perlin, They Keep It All Hid, supra note 4, at 876:

To teach mental disability law meaningfully, it is necessary to teach about the
core characteristics that contaminate it (sanism and pretextuality), to teach
about the cognitive approaches that distort it (false [ordinary common sense]
and cognitive-simplifying heuristics), and to teach the school of jurisprudence
that can optimally redeem it (TJ).
212 Lord et al., supra note 94, at 567. On the role of “voice” in other similar UN
Conventions, see Aisling Parkes, Tokenism Versus Genuine Participation: Children’s
Parliaments and the Right of the Child to be Heard Under International Law, 16
WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 1, 16 (2008) (discussing how children’s “voices
are all too often frequently overlooked and undervalued”).
213 Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific: The
Need for a Disability Rights Tribunal to Give Life to the U.N. Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 36 (2012) [hereinafter Perlin,
Promoting Social Change].
214 Id.
215 See Ronner, supra note 202, at 94–95.
216 See Perlin & Lynch, Mr. Bad Example, supra note 8, at 320.
217 Again, these attitudes are not limited to those teaching or practicing law in
the US. For a Canadian perspective, see Nathalie Des Rosiers, From Québec Veto to Québec
Secession: The Evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada on Québec-Canada Disputes, 13
CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 171, 174–75 (2000) (“One can find in the Therapeutic Jurisprudence
literature several references to the need for the tribunal to listen fully to all the concerns
of the participants, and to recognize the value of such expression.”); see also Frank Sirotich,
Reconfiguring Crime Control and Criminal Justice: Governmentality and Problem-Solving
Courts, 55 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 11 (2006); Timothy T. Culbert, Mental Health Law
Reform for a New Government in New Brunswick, 62 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J. 173 (2011).
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The CRPD and TJ principles are further entwined as
evidenced by the fact that the CRPD embraces the importance
of effective counsel for persons with disabilities, the right to
refuse treatment, and the protection of persons with disabilities
who are institutionalized.218 TJ and the CRPD are of vital
importance in order to promote, protect, and enforce the rights
of persons with mental disabilities.219 The CRPD, in honoring a
person’s dignity, ensures a more beneficial therapeutic process,
improved outcomes, and more effective exercise of state power,
when that power need be exercised.220
Writing previously about the CRPD and the guardianship
system prevalent in many civil law nations, one of the co-authors
said: “I believe that, if we embrace TJ, and the precepts of
procedural justice, we will have taken an important step towards
meaningfully enforcing the CRPD in ways that, for the first time,
will bring both due process and dignity to the guardianship
system.”221 Similarly, the CRPD will bring dignity and due
process to the entire mental disability law system.222 Almost
twenty years ago, the Florida Supreme Court recognized the
value of therapeutic jurisprudence in juvenile commitment
hearings.223 We believe that this approach would similarly
218 Mehgan Gallagher, No Means No, or Does It? A Comparative Study of the Right
to Refuse Treatment in a Psychiatric Institution, 44 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 137, 144–46 (2016).
219 Id. at 148.
220 Simon & Rosenbaum, supra note 153, at 48.
221 Perlin, Striking for the Guardians, supra note 91, at 1189.
222 See Gallagher & Perlin, supra note 156, at 292 (“The principles of TJ are also
in line with the CRPD’s requirement to treat individuals with disabilities with inherent
dignity and respect and to ensure ‘full and effective participation and inclusion in society’
for persons with disabilities.”).
223 See Amendment to the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.350.,
804 So.2d 1206, 1210–11 (Fla. 2001) (alterations in original):

According to the comment filed by Judge Ginger Wren and Professor Bruce
Winick, “Therapeutic jurisprudence is an interdisciplinary field of legal
scholarship and approach to law reform that focuses attention upon law’s
impact on the mental health and psychological functioning of those it affects.”
According to Judge Wren and Professor Winick, the dependent child’s
perception as to whether he or she is being listened to and whether his or her
opinion is respected and counted is integral to the child’s behavioral and
psychological progress. Their comment also explains that feelings of
voluntariness rather than coercion in children facing placement tend to
produce more effective behavior. Thus, Judge Wren and Professor Winick
contend that “[e]ven when the result of a hearing is adverse, people treated
fairly, in good faith and with respect are more satisfied with the result and
comply more readily with the outcome of the hearing.” As such, a child who
feels that he or she has been treated fairly in the course of the commitment
proceedings will likely be more willing to accept hospitalization and treatment.
The comment further asserts that juveniles involved in civil commitment
hearings are likely to be particularly sensitive to issues of participation,
dignity and trust. According to Judge Wren and Professor Winick, “[c]ivil
commitment hearings for juveniles that deny them the ability to articulate
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invigorate international human rights law as it applies to
questions that affect persons with mental disabilities.
CONCLUSION
The CRPD, at base, is a document that seeks to eradicate
and eviscerate “stigmas and stereotypes,”224 one that emphasizes
and “upholds the social inclusion [and] anti-stigma . . . agenda.”225
Its purpose is to “combat stereotypes, prejudices and harmful
practices relating to persons with disabilities.”226 It is also a
document that demands law reform at the local and national level
all over the world,227 whether in the United States or in the tiny
island nation of Vanuatu.228 Although much of its framework was
inspired by the principles and concepts in the ADA,229 the CRPD
goes far beyond the ADA in its positive mandates, its focus on
stigma and prejudice, its uncompromising adoption of the social
model, its reporting requirements, and its identification of the
specific steps that States must take to ensure an environment for
the enjoyment of human rights (such as “awareness-raising,
ensuring accessibility, ensuring protection and safety in situations
of risk and humanitarian emergencies, promoting access to justice,
their wishes through counsel, but which solely use guardians ad litem to
present the guardian’s views of the juvenile’s best interests, will not fulfill the
juvenile’s participatory or dignitary interests.”
See also, in this context, Bernard P. Perlmutter, George’s Story: Voice and
Transformation Through the Teaching and Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a
Law School Child Advocacy Clinic, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561, 563 n.9 (2005), discussing
the participation of the University of Miami School of Law, Children & Youth Law Clinic
in the process that led to the re-writing of these court rules:
We relied on the principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence to argue that
affording foster children a pre-commitment hearing at which they are
represented by counsel furthers their therapeutic interests and is
psychologically beneficial for these children. The Florida Supreme Court
agreed with and adopted this argument in the three decisions that it rendered
on the due process rights of foster children facing involuntary commitment to
these facilities. See M.W. v. Davis & DCF, 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000); see also
Amendment to Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350, 804 So. 2d
1206 (Fla. 2001); Amendment to Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P.
8.350, 842 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2003).
224 Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Incorporation of
Human Rights Law and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, 83 WASH. L. REV. 449, 475 (2008).
225 Fennel, supra note 129, at 107.
226 CRPD, supra note 27, at art. 8.
227 On the law reform obligations of the CRPD, see Lord & Stein, supra note 224, at 471.
228 See Paul Harpur & Richard Bales, The Positive Impact of the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: A Case Study on the South Pacific and Lessons
from the U.S. Experience, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 363, 364 (2010) (making this comparison).
229 See Janet Lord, The U.N. Disability Convention: Creating Opportunities for
Participation, BUSINESS L. TODAY, May/June 2010, at 23, 24.

2019]

VOICES IN THE NIGHT

907

ensuring personal mobility, enabling habilitation and
rehabilitation, and collecting statistics and data”).230 It also—
perhaps most importantly—makes visible what has long been
“invisible to the world’s political, social and economic process,”231
and reflects the reality that “only positive state action can combat
the deeply entrenched patterns of disability disadvantage arising
from stigma, devaluation, stereotyping and exclusion.”232
Mary Donnelly was precisely accurate when she argued
that “the goal of [mental disability] law reform must include
delivery on the rights . . . to dignity.”233 The CRPD has the capacity
to do this, but only if signatory nations grasp the extent to which
sanism has pervaded all mental disability law policy and
enforcement over the centuries. The application of TJ principles
will, finally, allow us to see this and to, we hope, make this truly
the “dawn of a new era.”234 And maybe then, also, finally, in Dylan’s
words, the “voices in the night”235 will, for once, be heard.

See PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 19, at 147.
Peter Blanck, “The Right to Live in the World”: Disability Yesterday, Today,
and Tomorrow, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 367, 401 (2008); on the invisibility of persons with
disabilities in this context in general, see PERLIN, supra note 6.
232 Ena Chadha & C. Tess Sheldon, Promoting Equality: Economic and Social
Rights for Persons with Disabilities Under Section 15, 16 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 27, 42 (2004).
233 Mary Donnelly, From Autonomy to Dignity: Treatment for Mental Disorders
and the Focus for Patient Rights, 26 L. CONTEXT 37, 57 (2008).
234 Perlin, A Change is Gonna Come, supra note 25, at 498.
235 Million Miles, Bob Dylan (1997), http://www.bobdylan.com/songs/millionmiles [http://perma.cc/Z7RS-DS9K].
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